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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the

petition;
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a Family

Settlement Agreement enforceable without formal court approval;
and
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding

petitioners were not entitled to a jury determination of their
equitable claims.
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1989).
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals did not enter its decision on December
29, 1989, as petitioners assert.

Rather, that Court entered its

decision on December 20, 1989. See, official report of opinion,
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989).l

Respite the December 20, 1989 decision date set forth in
the official reporter, petitioners assert the decision was
entered on December 29, 1989. As more fully discussed herein,
December 29, 1989 was the date the Court of Appeals amended its
opinion to correct a typographical error. Rule 45, however,
makes no mention of "opinion" or "amended opinion" but speaks
only in terms of "decision". An opinion might undergo many
changes before final publication, but the decision date remains
the same. There is no basis in the rules for petitioners'
assumption that a change in the textual "opinion" after a
decision is rendered tolls the time for filing a petition.

-1-

Although petitioners obtained an ex parte Order purporting
to extend the time for filing to February 28, 1990, or 38 days
past the prescribed time, Rule 45(e) of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court states in pertinent part:

"No extension shall

exceed 30 days past the prescribed time • . • ." The petition
was finally filed on February 20, 1990, or 31 days past the
prescribed time.

Thus, the petition is jurisdictionally out of

time.2
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-912: Private agreements among successors to decedent binding on personal representative.
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing
authorities, competent successors may agree among
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts
to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that
they provide in a written contract executed by all who
are affected by its provisions. . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-1101: Effect of approval of agreement
involving trusts, inalienable interests, or interests of third
persons.
A compromise of any controversy as to admission to
probate of any instrument offered for formal probate as
the will of a decedent, the construction, validity, or
effect of any probated will, the rights or interests in
the estate of the decedent, any successor, or the
administration of the estate, if approved in a formal
proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on
all the parties thereto, including those unborn,
unascertained, or who could not be located• An
approved compromise is binding even though it may
affect a trust or an inalienable interest. . . .
2

Rule 45(b) states that the clerk will refuse any petition
that is "jurisdictionally out of time."
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Utah Code Ann, S 75-3-1102:
approval of compromise.
(1)

Procedure for securing court

The procedure for securing court approval of a
compromise is as follows:
(a)

The terms of the compromise shall be set
forth in an agreement in writing which shall
be executed by all competent persons . . .
which will or may be affected by the compromise. Execution is not required by any
person whose identity cannot be ascertained
or whose whereabouts are unknown and cannot
reasonably be ascertained.

(b)

Any interested person, including the personal
representative of a trustee, then may submit
the agreement to the court for its approval
and for execution by the personal representative, the trustee of every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and
representatives.

(c)

After notice to all interested persons or
their representatives, including the personal
representative of the estate and all affected
trustees of trust, the court, if it finds
that the contest or controversy is in good
faith and that the effect of the agreement
upon the interest of the persons represented
by fiduciaries or other representatives is
just and reasonable, may make an order
approving the agreement and directing all
fiduciaries under its supervision to execute
the agreement. . . . Upon the making of the
order and the execution of the agreement, all
further disposition of the estate is in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

For purposes of opposing this petition, respondents do not
contest petitioners' recitation of the procedural history of this
consolidated action.

Petitioners' Statement of Facts, however,

-3-

is largely irrelevant, and in any case does not present a proper
background for purposes of the instant petition.
For example, without arguing that the lower courts' findings
were not supported by substantial evidence, petitioners include
in their Statement of Facts much of the direct evidence contrary
to the courts' findings without acknowledging the substantial
evidence presented in support.

Nevertheless, this Court must

view the findings of the courts below favorably, and not substitute its own judgment except to prevent manifest injustice if
the evidence clearly preponderates against those findings.
v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989).

Reid

Accord-

ingly, respondents adopt by this reference the Findings of Fact
entered by the district court as set forth at Appendix 2 to the
Petition, and those facts found by the Court of Appeals as set
forth in Appendix 1.
In addition, the following facts are of particular relevance
to the issues presented:
1.

With respect to the first question presented, the

"decision" of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered on
December 20, 1989, as set forth in the official report of that
decision at 784 P.2d 1238. Although the "opinion" that was
finally published had been amended to correct typographical
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errors on December 29, 1989, the judgment of December 20, 1989
was not changed or amended in any way.3
2.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue was filed

with the Court on February 20, 1990, or 31 days after the prescribed time for filing a petition.

See Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, No. 900082.
3.

To the extent facts relating to duress or failure of

consideration are relevant to the second issue presented, the
district court found the following:
32. By January 31, 1978, Mr. Salisbury [a partner
in the firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
retained by Maxine] had been made aware by Maxine of an
income tax case concerning Grimm's taxes pending before
the U.S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., which was being
handled by Mr. Bert Rand for Grimm prior to Grimm's
death.
33. In January and February of 1978, Mr.
Salisbury was informed and discussed with Maxine the
fact that for Philippine estate tax purposes, the
estate of non-citizen domiciliaries of the Philippines
included all property of the deceased, real or personal, tangible or intangible, where ever situated,
except real estate located outside the Philippines and
that the tax was 60%.
34. In January or February, 1978, Maxine retained
a lawyer in the Philippine islands, Mr. Edgardo Angara.
Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Angara exchanged telegrams and
conversed by telephone about the numerous questions
concerning the estate, including Grimm's domicile and
the effect of Philippines domicile, the law of legitime
by which children are compulsory heirs, and its effect
on the trust, the civil doctrine of collation, the
3

The typographical error in the original opinion is found on
page 10. Apparently, the subscript of footnote 9 was omitted
from the text at the end of the second sentence of the first full
paragraph of that page.
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assets subject to taxation by the Philippines and the
doctrine of renvoi as applied to succession from persons having citizenship different from their domicile.

At the time of Grimm's death, his estate, mostly
personal property, was in excess of $8 million, with
assets situated in the Philippines, in Hong Kong and in
the United States. There were numerous questions to be
resolved. Mr. Salisbury also corresponded with an
attorney in Reno, Nevada, concerning the validity of
Grimm's divorce and hence the validity of his marriage
to Maxine.
35. By February, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had concluded that it might be an advantage to work out a
settlement for tax purposes if the trust could be left
intact.
36. During March, 1978, Mr. Salisbury talked at
least five times with Maxine about legal issues concerning this estate and the possibility of settlement.
Mr. Salisbury made calculations as to what Ethel and
Nita might receive under various assumptions. Maxine
told Mr. Salisbury that Ethel had presented the paper
outlining a settlement proposal and he had asked her to
sign it. Mr. Salisbury advised Maxine not to sign, and
upon his advice, she did not do so.
37. Maxine was agreeable to and desirous of
entering into an agreement, but wanted it consummated
in Utah under Mr. Salisbury's supervision and wanted to
receive her one-half free of tax.

39. In late February or early March, 1978, Ethel
and Nita employed Mr. Donald Holbrook of Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook and McDonough to represent their interests in
Utah. Mr. Holbrook and others in his office and Mr.
Salisbury and others in his office communicated over a
period of several weeks. On April 4, 1978, Mr.
Holbrook's office and Mr. Salisbury's office stipulated
to the admission of the non-Philippine will to probate
in Tooele County under certain conditions. Final
negotiations, with Rex representing Ethel and Nita, and
Pete representing Maxine and Linda, consumed at least
five days, from April 20 through April 25, 1978. There
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were at least four drafts of the first draft [of the
Family Settlement Agreement] prepared by Mr. Salisbury.
The final agreement was incorporated into two documents, the settlement agreement and the supplemental
memorandum.
40. During the negotiations each side presented
points and proposals to advance the positions of their
clients. Pete and Mr. Salisbury were insistent that
the first wife, Juanita, sign the agreement to relinquish any claim she might have in the estate. During
the negotiations it was agreed that Maxine receive a
guaranteed minimum of $1,500,000 plus her two houses
and certain bank accounts regardless of the eventual
size of the estate.
Pete and Mr. Salisbury also
insisted that Maxine receive her share without reduction by way of death taxes. Negotiations also resulted
in an agreement that Pete and Linda receive certain
bank accounts and the Ethel and Nita be guaranteed a
minimum.
41. Mr. Salisbury communicated at least twice in
April with Maxine. Pete conferred with Mr. Salisbury
on a continual basis between April 17 and April 25,
1978. On the morning prior to signing the family
settlement agreement, Pete represented to Mr. Salisbury
that he had discussed the agreement with his mother
(Maxine) the night before and that she wanted to go
ahead.
42. The agreement was signed on April 25, 1978,
by Pete and Linda, by Pete as attorney-in-fact for
Maxine and by Rex as attorney-in-fact for Ethel and
Nita. It was also signed by both attorneys. Subsequently, a copy was signed by Nita in California and by
Ethel and Maxine in the Philippine islands. Pursuant
to the family settlement agreement, Mr. Salisbury was
retained as attorney for the estate to represent all of
the "heirs."
43. The family settlement agreement was not
signed as a result of threats, duress or coercion.
Maxine was represented by Mr. Salisbury who advised
Mrs. Maxine Grimm that he had investigated the claims
made by Nita and Ethel and she did not have to enter
into a settlement agreement if she did not desire to do
so.
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47. Subsequent to the signing of the settlement
agreement, all of the parties worked toward and pursuant to the agreement*

52. On September 20/ 1978, Mr. Salisbury wrote to
the beneficiaries again reaffirming the agreement.
This letter is the first of a number of reports to the
beneficiaries by Mr. Salisbury concerning the progress
of the estate pursuant to the family settlement agreement. At no time did Maxine, Pete or Linda take
exception to any of the reports of Mr. Salisbury.

54. Also in February, 1979, the U.S. estate tax
return was signed by Maxine and filed. The estate tax
issue was simplified and aided by the family settlement
agreement in the opinion of Mr. Salisbury. Under the
return, Maxine claimed the maximum marital deduction.

56. On May 23, 1979, $800,000 of the Everett
receivable was distributed in accordance with the
family settlement agreement and in the percentages
designated by the family settlement agreement:
$400,000 to Maxine and $100,000 each to the four
children. In addition, pearls and silver were distributed in accordance to the terms of the family
settlement agreement.
57. In September, 1979, the Philippine estate
taxes were paid. Because there were not sufficient
liquid funds to pay all of the estate taxes due, the
shortfall was paid by the respective beneficiaries in
accordance with their shares under the family settlement agreement.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Petition at Appendix 2
(citations omitted).
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4.

Each of the findings set forth above was upheld by the

Court of Appeals as not against the clear weight of the evidence.
See Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah App.
1989).
5.

With respect to the third issue raised by this peti-

tion, the procedural posture of the case is relevant.
Petitioners filed their Complaint seeking rescission of the
Family Settlement Agreement on numerous equitable grounds including duress and failure of consideration.

Respondents answered

petitioners' Complaint contending that the Agreement was valid
and enforceable, and filed a Counterclaim contending that in the
alternative, if the Agreement was not specifically enforceable,
petitioners had violated the terms of the Agreement thereby
giving rise to a breach of contract claim.

To this breach-

of-contract claim petitioners asserted affirmative defenses of
duress and failure of consideration.
The first issue to be decided by the district court was
whether petitioners would prevail on their rescission claims or
whether the Agreement could be enforced according to its terms.
The court decided to enforce the Agreement.

If the court had

decided the Agreement could not be specifically enforced, then
respondents would have sought a decision on their breach-ofcontract counterclaim.

That decision would have been made by the

jury, as would the decision as to whether duress or failure of
consideration constituted a defense.
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However, when the district

court made its decision on the equitable claims, there was no
need for any decision, by the court or jury, on respondent's
legal counterclaim, or on petitioners' affirmative defenses
thereto.

The statement of the district court before trial

contained in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be examined
in this procedural context:
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the
court will make the decision as to whether or not the
family settlement agreement is valid or invalid, and
then based upon that you may proceed on your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at that time the
plaintiffs here cannot say that they didn't have the
right for the jury to hear all of the defenses with
regard to coercion, duress and other defenses. . . .
(Tr. at 22.)
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
1.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue is lurisdictionally out of time.

To achieve finality after an already lengthy appellate
review process, the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court require that
a petition for writ of certiorari be filed within thirty (30)
days after "decision" by the Court of Appeals.
Supreme Court, Rule 45 (1987).4

Rules of Utah

The Rules go on to provide that

in special circumstances, particularly "upon a showing of excusable neglect of good cause," the time for filing a petition may

4

As noted at Note 1, supra, the Rules make no mention of
"opinion" or "amended opinion" but begin the running of the time
period at the date of "decision."
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be extended "not later than thirty days" beyond the original
thirty day period.

Id.

However, the Rules specifically state

"no extension shall exceed thirty days past the prescribed time
or ten days from the date of the entry of the order granting the
motion, whichever occurs later."

Id.

In this case, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision
on December 20, 1989.

See, official report of opinion, Matter of

Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989).5

The time

prescribed for filing any petition for writ of certiorari was
thus thirty days later, on January 19, 1990.
On January 3, 1990, petitioners filed an §x parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition For a Writ of Certiorari,
seeking the maximum 30 day enlargement allowed by the Rules.
Pursuant to that motion, petitioners obtained an ex parte Order
extending the time from January 19, 1990, to February 19, 1990.
See Order Granting Plaintiffs-Appellants' Ex Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated
January 3, 1990.
Nevertheless, on or about January 4, 1990, petitioners filed
an Amended Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition

Consistent with this date of "decision", Rule 30(c) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides that "entry by the
clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the entry of
judgment of the court." Clearly, a subsequent change in the text
of an opinion in no way altered the court's judgment entered as
of December 20, 1989.
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for Writ of Certiorari, requesting additional time up to and
including February 28, 1990, or 38 days past the prescribed time.
As the sole grounds for the additional extension, petitioners
stated in their motion that the Court of Appeals had entered an
amended opinion, and "although the amended opinion is not
substantively different from the original opinion, plaintiff/
appellants schedule is such and the issues involved in this
appeal are such that they need as much additional time as possible to prepare and file a petition,"

See, Amended Ex Parte

Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition For Writ of
Certiorari, filed January 4, 1990.
Significantly, however, there is no basis in the language of
the Supreme Court rules or otherwise for the eight days requested
beyond the original thirty-day extension.

The rules specifically

state that the period begins to run on the date the "decision" is
entered, without any references to the opinion or whatever
technical amendments to the opinion might be necessary.
Rules of Utah Supreme Court, Rule 45 (1987).

See

The rules go on to

provide "no extension shall exceed thirty days past the prescribed time or ten days from the date of entry of the Order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later."

Id.

Subsequent amendments to the text of the "opinion" notwithstanding, the "decision" in this case was entered on December 20,
1989.

Thus, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue, filed

February 20, 1990, was filed thirty-one (31) days past the
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prescribed time, and under the rules of this Court is jurisdictionally out of time,
2-

The Court of Appeals did not err in holdina a Family
Settlement Agreement was enforceable without formal
court approval.

Petitioners argue at length that Certiorari is necessary
here because petitioners disagree with the Court of Appeals'
reading of SS 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 of the Utah Code, and with
the Court of Appeals' reading of this Court's decision in The
Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986).
Petitioners' disagreement, however, in no way makes the Court of
Appeal's reading of the applicable statutes or case law incorrect, and the Petition should be denied.
For example, petitioners argue that § 75-3-1101 requires
court approval of a compromise settlement agreement before the
agreement has any legal effect.
Certiorari, at pp. 12-14.

See Petition for Writ of

However, neither that section, nor its

legislative history, even reach the issue of whether a compromise
agreement, entered into by competent adults represented by
counsel and after extensive negotiation, but which has not been
formally approved, has legal effect.

Rather, that section deals

with the effect of court approval under certain circumstances
once it has been obtained:
Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts,
inalienable interests, or interests of third persons.
A compromise of any controversy . . . if approved in a
formal proceeding in the court for that purpose is
binding on all of the parties thereto. . . . An

approved compromise is binding even though it may have
effect the trust or inalienable interest.
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-1101 (1975).
In fact, to read § 75-3-1101 as requiring court approval of
all agreements, rather than stating the effect of such approval
under certain circumstances, would be inconsistent with S 75-3912.

That section by its terms governs private agreements, and

states as follows:
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing
authorities, competent successors may agree among
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts
to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that
they provide in a written contract executed by all who
are affected by its provisions.
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-912 (1975).6
Interpreting § 75-3-1101 as simply stating the effect of
approval without requiring approval is consistent with the only
case cited by counsel which resolves the precise issue presented
under a similar statutory scheme, In re Pecks Estate. 34 N.W.2d
533 (Mich. 1948).

The court there stated:

It was not necessary to secure the consent of the
probate court to the settlement as there were no minors
or unknown heirs involved. The courts encourage settlements where there is no fraud or mistake and the
parties are of age, particularly so where there is a

6

This section does not require that any compromise agreement
be submitted to probate court for approval before it has legal
effect.
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full understanding of the provisions in the settlement
and the parties are represented by able counsel.
34 N.W.2d, at 538.
By contrast, petitioners rely upon their own novel interpretation of In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Utah
1986), for the proposition that section 1101 requires approval of
a settlement agreement before it has any effect.

In Chasel,

however, the settlement agreement at issue had been approved by
the court.

The Supreme Court, consistent with § 75-3-1101,

simply stated that "if approved in a formal proceeding in the
court for that purpose [a compromise agreement] is binding on all
the parties thereto."

The Court simply did not decide the issue

present here, whether an unapproved compromise agreement between
competent adults is binding, and thus its statement relied on by
petitioners is, as stated by the Court of Appeals, dictum.7
Petitioners also argue in this regard that the Court of
Appeals was mistaken to hold that the compromise agreement at
issue was enforceable in spite of a spendthrift trust provision:
The FSA was either subject to the court approval
requirements of SS 1101 and 1102 and therefore not
binding prior to court approval or it was not subject
to the court approval provisions of SS 1101 and 1102
and therefore invalid and void from its inception
because it materially altered and terminated a spend-

7

And it is not at all clear,
parties in Chasel would have been
issue if it had not been approved
for Writ of Certiorari, at p. 16.
pletely different issue presented

as petitioners assert, that the
able to alter the agreement at
by the court. See, Petition
That is, in fact, the comby this case.
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thrift trust.
ways.

The Court of Appeals cannot have it both

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at p. 17.
Petitioners are incorrect, however, because the Family
Settlement Agreement was a legally binding document with or
without court approval.

There was nothing that made the Agree-

ment invalid and void from its inception.

When, through the

course of this lawsuit, the parties went through all of the
procedures necessary to obtain court approval pursuant to
§ 75-3-1102 and the court saw fit to approve the Agreement,
pursuant to § 75-3-1101 petitioners cannot complain that it is
invalid for affecting a spendthrift trust provision.

Thus, as

stated by the Court of Appeals:
We have found the FSA to be a valid contract, even
without court approval. However, the trial court in
its judgment approved the FSA. Under S 75-3-1101 it is
thus binding, even though it may affect a trust or
inalienable interest.
784 P.2d, at 1245.
3.

The Court of Appeals did not err in denvina petitioners
a jury trial on their equitable causes of action.

The only legal cause of action presented in petitioners'
Complaint was a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court denied

plaintiffs a jury trial on this issue when it decided the Family
Settlement Agreement was valid and enforceable and dismissed the
jury.

See, 784 P.2d, at 1248.
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Petitioners also argue, however, that they were denied a
right to a jury trial on the issues of duress and failure of
consideration.

"Once Respondents asserted the breach of contract

counterclaim and proceeded to trial on that claim. Petitioners
had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issues of
duress and failure of consideration."

See, Petition for a Writ

Certiorari, at p. 19.
Petitioners' argument, however, ignores the procedural
posture of this case and the issues actually presented to the
court for resolution.

At the close of the evidence when the

district court determined petitioners' equitable rescission
claims against them, there was no need for any decision to be
made on respondents' legal breach of contract claim, and thus no
need for any jury determination of either the legal claim or the
affirmative defenses to the claim.

As the Court of Appeals

stated "such affirmative defenses became moot."
1246.

784 P.2d at

Simply put, petitioners were not denied a jury determina-

tion of any issue that were not equitable except their claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Nor is this Court's holding in International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc.. 626 P.2d 418
(Utah 1981), to the contrary.

International Harvester simply

holds that Utah Constitution, Article I, S 10 is unambiguous in
guaranteeing a right to trial by jury.

But that case in no way

entitles any claimant to a jury trial of equitable issues.
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See

e.g., Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981) and Bradshaw
v, Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974).
CONCLUSION
After an already lengthy appellate review, the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at issue should be denied by this Court
because it is jurisdictionally out of time.

Even if the Petition

were not out of time, the decision of the Court of Appeals was in
no way erroneous and does not require additional appellate review
by this Court.

Thus respondents respectfully request that the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied.
DATED this 30

day of March, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

R. Brent Stephens
Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Respondents
RCK436
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 1990, I
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the following:
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Daniel L. Berman, Esq.
Peggy A. Tomsic, Esq.
Berman & O'Rorke
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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